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Executive Summary 
Accurate quantification of risks for vessel-to-platform collisions has been a goal of the 
petroleum industry for many years; however, technological advances in collision avoidance 
systems have not been reflected in current models.  Additionally, new modeling theories have 
been developed which capture the complexities of modern socio-technical systems.  This 
paper recommends that a new collision model be developed to reflect current collision 
avoidance systems.    
 
Today’s navigation tools 
Current models for collision probability between platforms and passing vessels were 
developed prior to the rapid expansion of GPS, electronic charts and AIS.   
 
Causal factors of ship- platform collisions 
Accidents are often the result of multiple factors.  Causal factors considered by current 
models are still very relevant today; but, because voyage planning procedures have changed 
in response to new technology, causal factors may have changed as well.    
 
Barriers to prevent collisions with platforms 
Technological advances have enhanced detection and communication barriers to prevent 
collisions.  GPS and electronic charts offer the vessel’s navigator improved situational 
awareness. With AIS, both the vessel and the platform are able to detect each other faster at a 
distance of approximately 40 nautical miles, compared to the 12 nautical mile radius offered 
by conventional radar.    
 
Alternative modeling theories 
Today’s accident models are based on fault trees and event trees.  They provide a sequence of 
events that must occur prior to a collision.  As technology improves and the complexity of 
socio-technical systems increases, these models will become less relevant.   
 
Suggested structure for a revised collision risk model 
Flexible simulation software is available and should be utilized to model the complexity 
behind a vessel-platform collision.  The suggested structure presented in this paper starts with 
four main systems: the vessel, the platform, VTS, and external conditions.   
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AIBN Accident Investigation Board Norway 
AIS Automatic Identification System 
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
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Definitions and Terminology 
500m Exclusion Zone:  
A safety area established around all active surface installations (and some subsea 
installations) which extends to 500m from any part of the installation. 
Blind vessel:  
A vessel with inadequate radar (either by malfunction or human error), and also experiencing 
poor-visibility conditions. 
Blunt End:  
The organization(s) that shapes the work environment through providing resources and 
developing policies and procedures.  
Charpy impact test:   
A mechanical test which determines the amount of energy absorbed by a material during 
breakage. 
Collision:  
A general term used to describe any contact between a vessel and an offshore platform.  
Cut Set:  
The set of components which if they all fail will cause the system to fail.   
Drifting Vessel:  
A vessel in the vicinity of a platform that has lost power and the ability to steer. 
Epidemiological Model:  
A model based on the theory that an accident occurs when latent and active failures align. 
Errant Vessel:  
A vessel which is on a collision course with a platform, but unaware of it due to inadequate 
watchkeeping. 
Near-miss:   
An accident which could have potentially occurred if it had not been interrupted. 
Passing Vessel:  
A vessel on route to somewhere other than the platform. 
Sequence of Events Model:  
A model based on the theory that an accident is caused by a chain of events and that removing 
one event will prevent the accident. 
Sharp End:  
The people in direct contact with the daily vessel operating conditions.  
Support vessel:  
An attendant vessel which has a bona fide reason for approaching the platform and has been 
granted permission from the platform to approach.  
Systemic Model:  
A model based on the theory that accidents are the byproduct of a normal system and occur as 
the result of imperfect knowledge and resource constraints. 
Waypoint:  
A set of coordinates or physical structure used for navigation.  
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1 Introduction 
The primary intent of this thesis is to discuss the current models used to predict vessel- 
platform collision frequency and to determine if they are satisfactory in assessing the risk 
posed by passing vessels.  The secondary purpose is to review alternate modeling theories 
which could be applied if it is necessary to update the collision risk model.  By reflecting on 
the causal factors of recent collisions and reviewing the current accident models, it is possible 
to see where improvements could be made to the current models.  
 
Although the North Sea has not experienced a major collision between passing merchant 
vessels and offshore platforms, the accident potential is significant.  With every new 
hydrocarbon discovery, the risk of ship- platform collision increases.  The platform operator 
has little influence over the collision potential beyond the selection of the platform’s location.   
 
Platforms are designed to withstand smaller impacts from supply vessels, but passing vessels 
generally travel at higher speeds and consequently the displacement will likely be greater than 
that of an attending vessel.  Even at modest speeds, the inherent energy transfer to the 
platform can easily cause deformation of structural members and possibly a total failure (17). 
Although only a small fraction of collisions recorded in the UKCS Ship/Platform Collision 
Incident Database involved passing vessels, the consequences of this type of accident are 
significant.   
 
Accurately modeling vessel-to-platform collision risk is a problem which has challenged the 
industry for over 20 years.  There are numerous social, technical, and environmental variables 
which influence the highly complex interactions between the captain and the vessel.  
Estimates from collision models are widely used as input for risk analysis; however, the 
models were developed in the late 1980’s and have not been updated to reflect recent 
technological advances.  Improvements such as GPS, electronic charts and AIS are tools used 
as aid in voyage planning and navigation.  VTS assists with monitoring and can give an early 
warning when a platform appears to be at risk (17).     
1.1 Specification of Need 
In the last twenty years, there have been numerous advancements which allow the navigator 
to perform his job in a safer manner.  As safe practices are continuously improved, one path to 
catastrophe may be removed but new error opportunities and sequences to failure are 
introduced (8).  For this reason, there is a need for the vessel-platform collision models to 
periodically be reviewed and updated to reflect improvements in technology and safe work 
practices.  The assumptions and judgment used when the current models were developed have 
has gradually become less relevant.   
1.2 Objectives 
This aim of this paper is to improve the overall model structure for vessel-platform collision 
risk.  Answering the following questions will help to determine which factors should be 
considered when updating or developing a new model: 
 
• Have improvements in technology reduced the frequency of passing vessel-platform 
collisions? 
• What are the causal factors of ship- platform collisions? 
• What barriers are in place to prevent such an event? 
• Should newer modeling theories be used to capture the socio-technical relationships? 
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1.3 Boundaries and Exclusions 
With focus on high speed collisions caused either by technical errors (e.g. machinery) or 
human errors (e.g. misinterpretation, watch keeper asleep, inattention), this paper includes a 
review of the primary contributors to collision risk caused by passing vessel traffic only.   
 
• Vessel-vessel collisions are excluded since they involved two moving objects.  
Platforms are assumed not to be able to change position.  
• Supply and standby vessels specific to the platform are not included.  These vessels 
are assumed to be traveling at lower speeds when inside the 500 m safety zone.  For 
this reason, the impact energies from these types of vessels are assumed not to have 
catastrophic consequences. 
• Navy vessels and submarine traffic are typically excluded since the probability for 
collision with these two vessel types is negligible compared with the probabilities for 
collision with other vessel types (9).   
• Acts of terrorism are also outside of the scope of this paper. 
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2 Background 
A collision between a vessel and a platform is a relatively foreseeable event.  Although the 
probability of a passing vessel collision is two orders of magnitude lower than an attendant 
vessel, the impact energy is expected to be much higher.  The safety, environmental, and 
business consequences of such a collision could be catastrophic (48).   
 
Since the early 1970s, efforts have been made by several organizations to quantify the risks of 
vessel-platform collisions. Technica was commissioned by the UK’s Department of Energy to 
carry out a study on the risks of collisions between passing merchant vessels and fixed 
platforms on the UKCS in 1981. As part of this study, the theoretical model CRASH was 
developed based on historical accident data and a detailed survey of the UKCS shipping 
traffic (43). 
 
In 1988, the Norwegian Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Loss (RABL) project was completed. 
The purpose of the project was to investigate the causes of buoyancy loss for semisubmersible 
drilling platforms in Norwegian and results were also applicable to fixed platforms.  RABL 
found that the main hazards which could impact platform buoyancy were ship collisions, 
ballast system failures and blowouts.  Furthermore, RABL concluded that the probability of a 
high-energy ship collision was greater than earlier estimates.  One of the technical 
recommendations made by the project was to focus on collision prevention measures, such as 
warning systems (15).  
 
RABL also aimed to develop a new analysis methodology be to assess platform safety levels 
and the COLLIDE project was initiated.  In 1989, the phase I of the COLLIDE project, which 
was limited to the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), was completed.  Phase II of 
COLLIDE extended the model to the entire North Sea and was completed in 1991 (12).  The 
CRASH model was updated in 1988 with improved shipping traffic data from the 
Commission of the European Communities COST-301 programme of research (43).   
2.1 Existing Collision Models  
Today, there are several commercial collision models that are used to estimate the frequency 
of collisions between passing merchant vessels and offshore platforms.  Table 2-1 summarizes 
the main models and the organization which developed them (48).  CRASH and COLLIDE 
are the most commonly used within the NCS. 
 
Table 2-1: Current Collision Risk Models 
Model Organization 
CRASH DNV 
COLLIDE CorrOcean Safetec 
COLRISK Anatec 
MANS MSCN (Netherlands) 
 
A platform is vulnerable to collisions from several different vessel types, including: 
• Navy vessels  
• Submarines 
• Shuttle tankers 
• Fishing vessels 
• Supply vessels 
• Standby vessels 
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• Merchant vessels 
 
The method used to calculate the collision risk frequency is not based upon the vessel type, 
but rather the way the vessel traffic travels in the area around the platform.  Vessel collisions 
may occur when the vessel is under power or when it is drifting.  With the exception of 
standby vessels, the drifting vessel collision frequency is low and is normally not included in 
the analysis (47).   
 
Existing models generally do not include navy vessels and submarines because the probability 
for collision with these two vessel types is negligible in comparison to the probabilities for 
collision with the other vessel types.  The collision risk from shuttle tankers is normally 
assessed separately (47). 
 
The models only predict the frequencies of vessel-platform collisions.  Presently, the 
consequences are not yet included (47).    
 
In general, the collision frequency calculation is based on the following factors: 
• The number of vessels that pass the location annually  
• The probability of the vessel heading towards the platform 
• The probability that avoidance planning was not used during voyage planning 
• A watch-keeping failure occurs 
• The vessel is not alerted in time by the platform or its standby vessel 
• The vessel fails to recover from the collision course 
• The field’s collision risk reduction measures 
 
Merchant vessels will generally sail in dedicated shipping lanes during passage from one 
destination to another. The position of the vessel is assumed to have a normal distribution within 
these lanes as illustrated in Figure 2-1.  To give an indication of the potential consequences, the 
collision frequency estimates are split into 5 size categories of traffic (47): 
• 0-1500 dwt 
• 1500-5000 dwt 
• 5000 - 15000 dwt 
• 15000 – 40000 dwt 
• > 40000 dwt 
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Figure 2-1: Normal Distributed Geometric Collision Probability (47) 
 
The collision frequency (collisions per year) is calculated is calculated as:  =  ×  ×  × 	 × 
 
where: 
N  = annual number of vessels passing in the lane 
Fd  = geometric collision probability, the fraction of vessels that are in the part  
of the lane heading towards the platform.  
P1  = probability that voyage planning was not correctly carried out  
P2  = probability of vessel watchkeeping failure or loss of control, 
P3  =  probability of platform or standby vessel failing to warn or divert a vessel  
on collision course, or vessel fails to recover from its errant state. 
 
This paper focuses on vessel-platform collisions.  Because this type of accident involves a 
moving vessel with a stationary object, it is assumed to share some of the same causal factors 
as a grounding accident.  Figure 2-2 shows the relative distribution of the casual factors 
leading to grounding accidents from 1970-78 for Norwegian vessels greater than 1599 GRT.  
During these years, over 40% of the groundings were due to a navigational failure.  Although 
the review of recent accidents indicates that ‘internal communicational failure’ is still a 
problem, some contributors, such as ‘error/deficiency in charts’, have likely been reduced by 
the introduction of electronic charts.     
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Figure 2-2 Primary Causal Factors in Grounding Accidents for Norwegian Vessels Greater than 1599 
GRT from 1970-78 (26) 
2.2 Influence of Technology on Major Collisions 
While current collision models are useful in their prediction of collision frequency, they are 
conservative in that they neglect the impact of modern navigational standards.  Accident 
theories have improved since these models were developed which now take into account the 
socio-technical relationships.   
 
Improvements made to navigational standards include (5): 
• GPS: In 1994, GPS was declared operational with 18 satellites that transmit signals 
to a GPS receiver.  This enabled the vessels location, velocity and direction to be 
determined.   
• ECDIS: Electronic Chart Display and Information System provided a computer based 
alternative to paper charts.  In 1996, IMO introduced ECDIS standards, which means 
that future SOLAS regulations could possibly approve replacing paper charts with 
ECDIS.  
• AIS: An Automatic Identification System became possible with the advent of 
transponders. In 2004, AIS became a requirement for SOLAS vessels. 
  
In 1999-2000, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PTIL) initiated a Risk Level to 
measure the risk level on the Norwegian shelf, known as "Trends in risk level" (RNNS).  
Since 2000, there has been a clear decline in potential vessels on a collision course; however, 
no clear improvement has been observed for major collisions (34).   
2.3 Vessels on Collision Course 
Most offshore platforms  on the NCS can withstand collisions with vessels up to 5,000 tons 
and traveling at 2 m/s.  Major collisions are those which occur with unauthorized vessels, of 
5000 DWT or more, traveling with high speed when the impact occurs.  As shown in 
Figure 2-3, there are so few of these incidents that no trend can be identified (36).  
Figure 2-3: The number of major collisions between vessels and 
 
Figure 2-4: NCS Ships on a possible collision course from 1996
 
The annual number of ships on a possible collision course in the NCS is shown in 
The increase in the number of vessels on collision course in 2002 is believed to be the result 
of improved monitoring and reporting of events.   As a result of better monitoring, it is 
possible to get a better understanding of the causal factors and to implemen
the probability of collision. 
 
Based upon this data, it could mean that the introduction of new navigational technologies 
(GPS, AIS, ECDIS) have very little influence over the passing vessel
probability.  
2.4 Maritime 
For centuries, shipping has played a vital role 
Most shipowners make safety an objective, but there are other objectives besides safety.
Occasionally, the vessel and crew standards are lowered to make a profi
choose a particular classification society for economic reasons.  
for the shipowner to reduce costs is to register the vessel in different country from where it 
normally operates.  This practice is called 
this option are shown in Figure 
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Figure 2-5: Reasons 
2.4.1 Regulations 
In 1948, the United Nations established the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
address maritime matters.  The 
Pollution Prevention’, was produced by the IMO, and is 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code
standard for the maritime industry, but it is the responsibility of the Flag states to enforce 
safety requirements.   
 
The objectives of the ISM Code are
• To ensure safety at sea 
• To Prevent human injury or loss of life
• To avoid of damage to the environment, 
It is important that the ISM Code and its requirements to company safety
systems are not viewed in isolation.  The other main safety conventions which must also be 
considered are:   
• Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
• Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
• The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
and its Protocol. 
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG)  
• The International Convention on Load Lines 
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The SOLAS Convention was established with the main objective of minimum standards for 
construction, equipment and operation of ships.  Most nations have ratified the SOLAS 
Convention.  As new technologies and safety knowledge are developed, the convention is 
amended (26).   
 
The concern for vessel-platform collision is reflected in many design codes.  Since 1980, the 
NPD has required that platforms shall be designed to withstand a minimum impact of 5000 
tons displacement at a speed of 2m/s for supply vessels.  This corresponds to a kinetic energy 
of 14 MJ for a sideways collision and 11 MJ for bow or stern collisions.  However, a passing 
vessel with 2-3000 tons displacement traveling at a speed of 5.5-6 m/s is capable of 
transferring 40-50MJ (2).     
2.4.2 Risk Profile 
Risk profiles, which are essentially simplified fault trees, are preferred by the IMO for the 
Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRA).  Fault trees are used by many models to illustrate the 
underlying causes of a vessel-platform collision.  The risk profile, shown in Figure 2-6, 
requires less knowledge and experience to construct.  Since they are primarily based on 
historical accidents.  Both techniques seek to determine the underlying causes of a 
collision (26). 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Risk Profile for an Accidental Collision (26) 
2.4.3 Regulatory Authorities 
The regulatory authority for technical and operational safety, emergency preparedness, and 
the working environment over the petroleum activities in Norway is the PSA.  A ship on a 
collision course is one of the PSA’s focus areas and the frequency of this risk has been 
measured in their report “Trends in risk levels 2009”.  They note a substantial decrease in the 
number of vessels on collision course after 2002.  The introduction of AIS on all larger ships 
10 
 
is assumed to be the main reason for this decline.  With AIS is it easier to identify a vessel and 
to avert collisions by taking precautionary measures such as calling them (35).   
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3 Methodology 
In order to evaluate scenarios that could lead to a passing vessel-platform collision, recent 
collisions have been reviewed.  The main technological advances considered by this paper are 
introduced in this section, but are discussed further in section 4.  
3.1 Literature  
Throughout this evaluation process, literature has played a key role.  The goal of initial 
searches was to achieve a greater understanding of topic in order to formulate the research 
questions.  Keywords included: AIS, GPS, electronic charts, vessel-platform collisions, causal 
factors, and human error. 
 
The main driver for this thesis is the improvements in technology and what this means for the 
current models.  The review began by learning about the current models.  It was also 
important to review the causal factors behind accidents and near misses for recent passing 
vessel collisions.  One challenge was finding enough documentation.  Such collisions are 
infrequent and due to the guarded nature of the maritime industry, it is believed that near miss 
incidents are under reported.  This is reflected in Figure 3-1.  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Observation of incidents for three different branches of transportation (A-Accidents; I&NM- 
Incidents and near misses; PDS-Potentially dangerous situation) (10) 
 
3.2 Interviews 
While undertaking this thesis, interviews were carried out with ConocoPhillips, Det Norske 
Veritas, SafeTec and Simon Møkster Shipping.  Chief objectives of these interviews were to 
learn more about: 
• Collisions which have occurred to determine what went wrong 
(human/mechanical/weather) 
• Any other factors which could lead to a collision  
• Why the barriers failed  
• Consequences 
• Improvements in safe work practices 
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• How technological advances impact collision risk 
3.3 Review of Recent Collisions 
Vessel navigators are under pressure to be on time, produce at the desired level, keep the 
clients happy, and not to incur any unnecessary cost.  Obviously, they do not set out to collide 
with platforms, but safety may be compromised to achieve efficiency.  For collision barriers 
to be effective, a safety environment must be created at all levels of the industry (8).   
 
When analyzing the failures, ideally, the whole system should be evaluated.   But too often 
the focus often lies on the people who were directly involved with the accident.  But, the 
shipowner also influences the opportunity for an accident by putting constraints and pressures 
on the captain.  The cargo holder also influences the manner in which the vessel will operate.  
They decide what they’re willing to pay and they select the ship, but if an accident occurs, 
they have virtually no liability (26). 
 
It is important to understand why the decisions that lead to an accident made sense to the 
navigator, otherwise the history will probably repeat itself.  For example, in 2004, M/V Far 
Symphony collided with West Venture Platform because the captain was unaware that 
autopilot was engaged when he attempted to maneuver the vessel manually.  Five years later, 
the duty officer on the Big Orange XVIII bridge activated the vessel's autopilot in order to 
answer a telephone call in an adjacent room on the bridge.  He failed to deactivate it upon 
returning to the steering position.  Because the vessel was in the 500 m safety zone the 
autopilot should not have been engaged (33).   
 
According to Kristiansen (26), maritime accidents have some common characteristics: 
1. Routine 
• Accidents are often associated with normal activities 
2. Gradual escalation 
• Accidents rarely happen instantaneously  
• Usually due to the inability to handle situations as they emerge 
3. Multiple causes 
• An accident usually occurs due to several causal factors related to technology, 
humans and organization which interact with each other. 
4. Human error 
• Accidents often involve human errors which should be viewed in a wider 
scope 
5. Situational factors 
• There are usually situational characteristics (i.e. external conditions, 
competence, workload, work environment, mental state, etc.) 
 
A review of accidents which have occurred in recent years revealed some similarities.  
Table 3-1 provides an overview of the causal factors.  Most of the information is based on 
accident investigation reports acquired from the NPD.  A more in depth discussion of the 
casual factors and the barrier failures is given in section 4. 
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Table 3-1 Causal Factors of Recent Collisions 
Year Vessel/ Installation involved Causal Factors 
06.03.1988 Submarine U27 – collision with 
Oseberg B Jacket  
Platform on navigational charts, but no 
signal received from the sonar (53) 
30.09.1995 M/S Reint - collision with H-7 Ship on Autopilot and captain was 
absent from the bridge (53) 
05.03.2000 “Knock Sallie”- collision with 
Norne FPSO” 
Error in the DP software causing 
erroneous movements to be made.  The 
captain had experience, but reacted to 
late.  The residual crew was 
inexperienced and had little training in 
operating systems. (44) 
08.05.2002 Marbella (factory vessel) – 
collision with BD platform of 
the Bravo installation  
A number of causal factors led to this 
collision, including the lack of a 
satisfactory voyage plan and proper 
position plotting in relation to the 
installation, and an unexplained 
alteration of course to starboard some 6 
minutes before the collision. (51) 
07.03.2004 Far Symphony - collision with 
West Venture 
On autopilot trying to maneuver the 
vessel manually. Manual maneuvering of 
the vessel is not possible when the 
autopilot is engaged. (53) 
02.06.2005 Ocean Carrier - collision with 
bridge between EKOP and 
EKOT 
 
• Miscommunication during crew 
change 
• Not following governing documents 
• Lack of communication on the 
bridge (6) 
13.11.2006 Navion Hispania - Incident with 
Njord Bravo 
DP in autopos mode with only port main 
propeller and rudder active as a result of 
bad fuel and loss of thrust (46) 
04.08.2007 M/V Jork - collision with 
Viking Echo Gas Platform  
• Distracted while doing admin work 
on the computer. 
• Possibly intoxicated (50) 
09.07.07 Bourbon Surf – collision with 
Grane Platform 
Navigators on the bridge with a focus on 
navigation 
• Both the captain and first officer 
were absent from the control console, 
leaving the ship unsupervised on 
autopilot.  
• Incorrect judgment of the ships speed 
and distance to the platform. 
• The ship set the platform as the way-
point.    
• 500 m Pre-enty checklist not 
completed 
• Clearance for passage of the 500-
meter zone (22) 
06.10.2008 Federal Kivalina grounding The pilot turned his attention away from 
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the navigation during the last 15 minutes 
before the ship ran aground.  (1) 
08.06.2009 Big Orange XVIII - collision 
with Ekofisk 2/4-W 
Autopilot engaged in 500 m safety zone.  
Tried to maneuver the vessel manually, 
but it was not possible with the autopilot 
is engaged. (33) 
3.4 Modern Technology 
The review of accidents in the previous section indicates that a majority of the passing vessel-
collisions on the NCS are accidents are due to human factors.  A platform has no control over 
the actions of passing vessels and when a vessel is traveling at full speed time can be a critical 
factor to successfully carrying out the platform’s emergency response plans.  With new 
technology it may be possible to identify a collision scenario sooner and to contact the vessel 
earlier, enabling the collision to be averted.    
3.4.1 Introduction of GPS 
Before GPS, the navigational standard was DECCA, a low-frequency radio navigation 
system.  The maximum daylight range was around 400 nautical miles, but at night the 
accuracy was reduced to 200-250 nautical miles depending on propagation conditions (49).  
This system was primarily used for navigation in coastal waters (29).  With GPS, the range 
has increased to the entire planet, as the navigator can zoom in/out and pan (42).  GPS has 
revolutionized the way many vessels navigate by quickly and accurately determining the 
vessels position, velocity, and heading in the open sea.            
 
More information on GPS is found in Section 4.2.1.1. 
3.4.2 Introduction of Electronic Charts 
GPS positioning information has enabled a computer based alternative to paper charts.  The 
main advantage of electronic charts if that they can be automatically corrected, with very little 
effort on the part of the navigator.  With Navigation systems, such as GNSS (Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems), the ships position will be continuously plotted, eliminating the 
possibility of human plotting error.  Furthermore, with the advent of electronic transmission, 
the ship can receive chart corrections immediately (5).   
 
More information on Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is found in 
Section 4.2.1.2 
3.4.3 Introduction of AIS 
According to SOLAS, all vessels larger than 300 GRT were required to be fitted with 
Automatic Information Systems (AIS) by December 31, 2004.  AIS is used as a complement 
to radar to improve the safety and efficiency of navigation.  AIS uses a transponder system to 
transmit real-time information such as the vessel’s name and GPS position.  This information 
can be received by other vessels or onshore locations (i.e. VTS) and automatically uploaded 
onto electronic charts.   
 
Many vessel- platform collisions are due to poor watchkeeping, ignorance of the platforms 
existence or using the platform as a waypoint.  Having the AIS linked to the ECDIS enables 
the officer on the SBV and or VTS to call the vessel on collision course by its name, which 
increases the probability of successfully attracting the attention of the vessel by VHF radio 
(52).    
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More information on AIS is found in Section 4.2.1.3. 
3.5 Basis for New Model 
Although there is no clear reduction in passing vessel-platform collisions, an update of the 
model should be made to reflect the technological advances.  A collision is an undesirable 
event for both the maritime and petroleum industries.  Consequently, regulations and 
technology will continually improve in order to prevent collisions from happening.   
 
Technological standards for the maritime industry are not the only thing that has improved 
over the last 20 years.  Modeling theories have evolved as well to keep up with the intricacies 
of socio-technical systems (18).  These theories will be discussed in section 5.   
 
Regardless of whether a new model is developed of the current models are updated, it is 
important to understand the causal factors and barrier failures which can lead to a collision.  
These are discussed in section 4.     
  
4 Model for Vessel-Platform
In the previous section, recent accident events were discussed
of such events and the limitations of the accident reports, these accidents only provide a small 
indication of what can lead to a 
taken at the causes of collisions and 
information for this section was literature review and conversations with maritime 
professionals.   
 
An accurate definition of the system is needed befo
developed.  A “bow-tie diagram” will be used to aid in the development of the risk picture.  
The subsections in this chapter follow the activities shown in 
identify the causal factors which could lead to a vessel on collision course
step is the most important because 
There are obvious scenarios that might lead to a c
bridge); but, they are usually the result of several causal factors which unfold gradually.  
These factors can represent equipment failures, human error, or external factors (i.e. weather).
 
The second step is to define the barriers
collision course.  These can range from the ship
 
Finally, if the first set of barriers should fail and lead to the vessel on collision course with the 
platform, there is a second group of barriers to prevent the catastrophic consequences from 
occurring.        
 
 
4.1 Causal Factors leading to Collision
Causal factors are the conditions or actions that put the vessel at risk of a collision.  These 
factors take place before to the casualty, 
event.  Causal factors are shaped by the following two decision levels
 
1. Sharp end: the daily vessel operating conditions
2. Blunt end: management decisions made onshore 
 
To understand the cause of an accident, the whole system must be evaluated.  
caused by a combination of operator, technol
There is a tendency for people to focus on the consequen
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 Collision 
. But because of the infrequency 
vessel-platform collision.  In this section, a deeper l
the barriers in place to prevent them.  The main source of 
re a ship-platform collision model can be 
Figure 4-1.  The first step is to 
 (top event)
only causes which have been identified may be addressed.  
ollision (such as being absent from the 
 which should prevent the vessel from going on a 
-owners policies to IMO regulations.  
Figure 4-1: Bow-tie diagram 
 
and are not directly associated with the accident 
 (26): 
 
 
ogy, work conditions, and organizational factors.  
ces rather than the root causes, which
ook is 
. This 
 
 
 
Accidents are 
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is why it is easy to focus on the sharp end, as it envelops the people who were closest to 
causing the collision.  In daily operations the navigator faces difficulties varying from 
communication problems to high workloads.  On the blunt end, the business climate may 
shape the safety and maintenance policies.  It is the management side which can create 
opportunities for error through time constraints and lack of resources.   
 
The causal factors listed in this section originated as an outcome of the literature review and 
interviews.  It was found that accidents are the result of a combination of the following: 
• The Navigator 
• Natural Phenomena 
• The Ship 
• The Route 
• Traffic Congestion 
4.1.1 The Navigator 
It must be assumed that the navigator comes to work with intentions of performing his job 
safely and without impacting the environment.  However safety is not the navigator’s only 
objective.  He must provide a service in a timely manner and avoid incurring any unnecessary 
costs for the owner.  One reason the navigator is selected for the job is his ability to balance 
all of the operational demands in parallel with the company’s safety objectives (8).  
 
The primary role of the watch-keeper is to assure safe navigation of the vessel.  As a result of 
the demanding environment, there are various challenges associated with this performing this 
task.  On one hand, there are work overloads which occur as a result of various factors, such 
as minimum manning levels, the required documentation for each port, short transit times 
and/or poor levels of visibility which demand a higher level of concentration.  On the other 
hand, work underloads exist due to the passive nature of the task in uncongested waters (24).       
 
One of the first studies on human error in ship operation included the following factors (26): 
• Distraction 
• Fatigue 
• Alcohol 
• Vague pilot-master relationship 
• High Turnover 
• Poor bridge design 
• Inadequate operational procedures 
• Unclear use of sounds and signals 
 
Many of these factors still apply today.  An additional factor which can appear during ‘boom’ 
times is the increased use of foreign workers, which leads to communication problems due to 
language and cultural barriers.  A 2007 study performed for the Norwegian Labor and 
Welfare Administration revealed that one out of three Norwegian companies use foreign 
workers from EU countries.  About half of these workers were hired on a contract basis.  
These workers, mostly Polish and Swedish, provide much needed labor, but language barriers 
create challenges in relation to occupational accidents.  Language problems can result in 
verbal instructions being incorrectly understood.  With globalization, it is important to 
understand how these challenges are addressed by safety management and how they will 
affect the accident models (21).  
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The ISM code states that the company who is responsible for ship operation, presumably the 
owner, should ensure that the master (navigator) is properly qualified, familiar with the safety 
management system and given the necessary support.  Yet, it is estimated that 75-90% of 
accidents are rooted in human error.  By definition, the navigator will be associated with the 
accident events. Human error occurs when the procedures are disregarded or carried out in a 
less than adequate manner.  These discrepancies are usually related to omission, commission, 
wrong timing or sequence.  Negligence also falls under this grouping (26).  
 
Because offshore platforms are visible from long distances and their position is accurately 
plotted on navigational maps they are attractive navigational aids for many mariners.  
Although the navigator will take action to avoid colliding with the platform, any inaccuracies 
in the navigational equipment could lead to a collision.  Often the passing vessel will violate 
the 500 m safety zone to approach the platform and confirm its identity (27).   
 
As new technologies are introduced the navigator must recognize the new opportunities for 
error.  For example, the introduction of ARPA has been suggested to reduce the prudence of 
the navigator (26).  It would be useful to investigate further how navigational practices have 
evolved over time with the introduction of GPS, ECDIS, and AIS.  On one hand, AIS could 
potentially reduce the likelihood of a collision by eliminating the need for a close inspection.  
But alternatively, it could result in more vessels using the platform as a waypoint, since the 
location will be marked on the ECDIS.   
4.1.2 Natural Phenomena 
The radar performance can be noticeably affected by certain meteorological conditions 
without warning.  Some natural phenomena, such as heavy wind or rain, can affect the radar 
display which will be obvious to the observer.  But there are other meteorological conditions 
which can affect the propagation of radar wave through the atmosphere and cause degradation 
in the performance without being obvious to the radar observer (17). 
 
Precipitation      
The radar energy may be scattered by all types of precipitation, (i.e. rain, hail, sleet and snow) 
which weakens the pulse and reduces the detection ranges.  ‘Rain clutter’ occurs when the 
precipitation reflects back enough energy to the radar that it is displayed.  This impacts the 
ability of the vessel to detect targets, as there will be a lack of contrast between the echo and 
the background in precipitation areas.  Because of its greater water content, rain tends to have 
more of an effect on radar clutter.        
     
Sea Conditions 
The height of the waves can significantly affect the range at which the vessel on collision 
course can be detected and consequently the efficiency of the platform’s collision avoidance 
strategy.  ‘Sea clutter’ will be displayed when sufficient energy from the water is reflected 
back to the radar display.  It can occur in any sea condition other than smooth water and, like 
rain clutter, the resulting contract between the echo and the background it can make it difficult 
to detect small targets in the area.  The ARPA system may register a larger number of ghost 
targets in sea states where the significant wave height is in excess of 5 meters or there is a 
large swell.  
 
Furthermore, the vessel’s movement, and consequently the radar performance, will be 
effected by the sea state.  As the waves cause the vessel to roll and/or pitch, the center of the 
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radar beam may fluctuate from the sea to above the horizon.  The vessel size and stability will 
determine its susceptibility to sea induced movement.       
 
Fog and mist 
Although fog and mist generally do not produce echoes, dense fog can slightly reduce the 
detection range.  The impact of fog on the visibility is mentioned in section 4.1.4. 
 
Propagation 
Under normal atmospheric conditions (1atm and 15°C at sea level with a constant 60% 
relative humidity), the radar horizon is approximately 15% further than the visible horizon.  
With variations in the prevailing atmospheric conditions, anomalous propagation can occur, 
but it is nearly impossible to predict the extent to which these irregularities occur.    
• Sub-refraction – Radar detection ranges may be reduced if the lapse rate is greater 
than normal or if there is an increase in relative humidity with height, e.g. areas where 
cold air moves over a warm sea surface. 
•  Super-refraction - Radar detection ranges may increase if the lapse rate is greater than 
normal or if there is a decrease in relative humidity with height, e.g. warm air moving 
over a cold sea surface. 
• Radar Ducting – At certain heights, it is possible for the temperature to rise with 
greater altitudes.  A duct can occur which leads to ‘second trace returns’, by trapping 
the radar pulses and allowing them to travel increased distances over the Earth’s 
surface.  
 
AIS is considered to be a complement to radar.  Should natural phenomenon effect the radar, 
ECDIS and AIS the can reduce the risk of collision.  Platforms equipped with an AIS 
transponder will benefit with a risk reduction of 10% (9).  Electronic charts can also offer an 
advantage over paper charts, as notes from a previous voyage in the area, which could be 
beneficial to the navigator may be retrieved.  To obtain a clearer picture of the benefit, survey 
of the level of detail and how frequently navigators store notes on the electronic charts could 
be useful.  
4.1.3 The Ship 
Stability & Maneuverability 
As mentioned earlier, the size and stability of the ship will determine is susceptibility to sea 
induced movement.  Larger vessels will generally be more stable, but as size increases the 
maneuverability decreases.  For both large and small vessels, the velocity of the passing 
vessel on collision course will affect the time to until the potential collision, which will 
influence the effectiveness of the platform’s collision avoidance plan.  Good communications 
and effective promulgation are important for reducing the risk of an incident. 
   
Technical Standard 
Substandard ships and ship owners pose a safety hazard, which is difficult to control due to 
the international nature of the maritime industry.  More than half of the collisions in the North 
Sea are due to old and/or flags of convenience (FOC) vessels (27).  Although FOC are 
associated with substandard shipping and poorer work conditions, there has been a steady 
growth in flagging out.  Some flag states, known as Flags of Convenience FOC, lack both the 
drive and competence to enforce the safety standards set by the IMO (26).  
 
Due to the shortcomings of Flag state control, there was a need for Port States to challenge 
certificates of foreign vessels.  In 1982 a Memorandum of Understanding on Port State 
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Control (MOU PSC) was signed by 19 European states and Canada.  This gives Port States 
the authority to control shipping in their own waters through inspections of foreign vessels.  If 
several deficiencies are found during the inspection, the vessel will be detained.  As shown in 
Figure 4-2, several Flag States have a detention rate much higher than average.  Typical areas 
for deficiencies are shown in Table 4-1.  
 
The average detention percentage was 4.9% in 2008.  Figure 4-2 only includes flags with 20 
and more port State control inspections with detention percentage exceeding the average.  
High risk flags such as Bolivia and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also had high detention rates, 
83.33% and 90.91% respectively, but do not appear on the figure because there were less than 
20 inspections of these flags. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Detention Rate in % forFlag States exceeding the average rate (32) 
 
 
Nearly 25% of the deficiencies found during the State control inspections relate to the 
equipment and machinery, with 12% of the total deficiencies pertaining to navigational 
equipment. 
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Table 4-1: Detention rate in % for inspection areas (32) 
 2006 2007 2008 
Def. Main Group  Category of deficiencies  Def  Def%  Def  Def%  Def  Def%  
Certificates Crew certificates 2684 4,1% 3098 4,1% 3341 3,99% 
Ship's certificates and 
documents 
4198 6,3% 5152 6,9% 5458 6,55% 
Total Certificates 6882 10,4% 8250 11,0% 8826 10,54% 
Equipment and 
Machinery 
Mooring arrangements 936 1,4% 1122 1,5% 1343 1,6% 
Propulsion and auxiliary mach. 5077 7,7% 5379 7,2% 6283 7,5% 
Radio communications 2724 4,1% 3040 4,1% 3009 3,59% 
Safety of navigation 7570 11,4% 7875 10,5% 10174 12,14% 
Total Equipment and Machinery 16307 24,7% 17416 23,3% 20809 24,83% 
Management ISM related deficiencies 3087 4,7% 4657 6,2% 4641 5,54% 
Total Management 3087 4,7% 4657 6,2% 4641 5,54% 
Safety and Fire 
Appliances 
Alarm signals   488 0,7% 532 0,7% 608 0,73% 
Fire safety measures 8511 12,9% 9319 12,5% 10039 11,98% 
Life saving appliances 6017 9,1% 6147 8,2% 6465 7,71% 
Total Safety and Fire Appliances 15016 22,7% 15998 21,4% 17112 20,42% 
Security Maritime security 735 1,1% 775 1,0% 951 1,13% 
Total Security 735 1,1% 775 1,0% 951 1,13% 
Ship and Cargo 
Operations 
Cargoes 567 0,9% 593 0,8% 689 0,82% 
Gas and chemical carriers 192 0,3% 226 0,3% 291 0,35% 
MARPOL - annex I 4601 7,0% 5097 6,8% 5034 6,01% 
MARPOL - annex II 68 0,1% 162 0,2% 98 0,12% 
MARPOL - annex III 13 0,0% 11 0,0% 0 0,0% 
MARPOL - annex IV 39 0,1% 46 0,1% 149 0,18% 
MARPOL - annex V 640 1,0% 743 1,0% 790 0,94% 
MARPOL - annex VI  92 0,1% 163 0,2% 176 0,21% 
MARPOL related 
operational deficiencies 
121 0,2% 125 0,2% 192 0,23% 
Operational deficiencies 2135 3,2% 2544 3,4% 2756 3,29% 
Total Ship and Cargo Operations 8468 12,8% 9710 13,0% 10175 12,15% 
Stability and 
Structure 
Bulks carriers 171 0,3% 270 0,4% 328 0,39% 
Load lines 3118 4,7% 3414 4,6% 4204 5,02% 
Structural safety 5183 7,8% 5875 7,9% 6882 8,21% 
Total Stability and Structure 8472 12,8% 9559 12,8% 11414 13,62% 
Working and Living 
Conditions 
 
Accident prevention (IL 
O147) 
1369 2,1% 1559 2,1% 1829 2,18% 
Accommodation 1684 2,5% 1943 2,6% 2366 2,82% 
Food and catering 1673 2,5% 1886 2,5% 1989 2,37% 
Working spaces 2449 3,7% 2960 4,0% 3639 4,34% 
Total Working and Living Conditions 7175 10,8% 8348 11,2% 9823 11,71% 
End Total 66142  74713  83751  
 
Submarine traffic is typically excluded from collision models since the probability for 
collision with this vessel type is negligible compared to the probabilities for collision with 
other vessel types.  But there have been a few collisions between platforms and submerged 
submarines.  It should be noted that in areas where submarines operate, it may be necessary to 
install submarine beacons and additional promulgation may be required (48).   
4.1.4 The Route 
Obstacles 
In areas where there are a large numbers of vessels and platforms, it could be reasoned that 
the watchkeeper will be more vigilant than in areas where obstacles are sparse.  However, 
data for passing vessel collisions does not support this.  Areas where platforms are more 
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numerous are at greater risk; probably because the watchkeeper’s heightened awareness is unable 
to compensate for the increased risk in congested areas (13). 
 
Visibility 
When visual observation is not possible, the navigator must depend on electronic aids.  Even 
though the vessel should be traveling at reduced speeds and it is assumed that the navigator 
will be more vigilant, accident statistics indicate that a large proportion of collisions occur 
when visibility is poor.  If a SBV is utilized as part of a platform’s collision avoidance 
strategy, low visibility will impact the ability of the watchkeeper on the bridge to visually 
identify a collision scenario.  Furthermore, the platform’s Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is 
likely to require the SBV to approach the vessel and to use maritime light and sound signals.  
Poor visibility will impede the effectiveness of these methods.       
 
In the late 1970’s the effect of visibility was studied in the Dover Strait.  Three visibility 
classes were applied in this study: 
• Clear: Greater than 4km 
• Mist/fog: 200m-4km 
• Thick/dense: Less than 200m 
 
For the Dover Strait, the probability of collision was found to be 300 times higher for the 
‘Thick/dense’ visibility; however, because such conditions occur less that 1% of time, this 
class was found to contribute to 68% of collisions (26). 
 
To better understand the affect that technological advances have had, a similar study can be 
carried out in the North Sea for platforms to determine how visibility affects the collision risk.  
The observed data can be used to find the Fog Collision Risk Index (FCRI). 
 = 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Where 
Pi = Probability of collision per million encounters 
Vi = Fraction of time that the visibility is in the range i 
i = Visibility ranges: from clear (1) to zero visibility (n) 
 
Past and present data for the visibility ranges for weather stations in the North Sea can be 
found using a climate database.  Norwegian meteorological institute implemented a free data 
policy in September 2007 and consequently all climate data is available for free (28).    
 
The constant, k, corresponds to the failure frequency for 100% clear visibility It may be found 
using the FCRI and historical collision frequency, μ. 
  =  ! "  
 
Now it is possible to find the collision frequency in terms of the visibility. 
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4.1.5 Traffic Congestion 
In the North Sea, the risk of a collision for a platform located near a busy shipping lane is 
comparable to that of a major fire on a platform.  Whereas, the likelihood of a collision for an 
platform in a more isolated location away from shipping lanes is relatively insignificant (27).  
All 8 of the passing vessel–platform collisions observed in the UKCS database occurred in the 
Southern area of the North Sea, which is more densely populated with shipping traffic (13).  
Clearly, there is an opportunity to influence the probability of a passing vessel collision in the 
design phase, when the platform’s location is determined. 
 
Factors which influence the probability of collision include (17): 
• Traffic density and proximity to the target location 
• Proximity to traffic separation schemes, vessel routes and/or constricted navigational 
channels 
• Other types of shipping passing in the area 
• Size, speed and habits of passing traffic.  
• Fishing routes and activity in the area. 
• Estimates competency of the regular traffic crews  
 
These factors will need to be assessed before locating a platform.  By applying the appropriate 
vessel traffic data and vessel-platform collision models, the likelihood of experiencing a 
collision can be estimated.  The assessment of traffic density may be carried out using 
COAST database.  This data comprises numerous sources including port log data provided by 
LMIS (Lloyds Maritime Information Services), radar data from offshore and onshore radar 
stations, manual vessel traffic surveys, operator information etc (39).   
 
In the UK sector, the densities are defined as (48): 
 Low:   <1,000 passing vessels per year 
Low to Medium: 1,000 to 5,000 passing vessels per year 
Medium to High: 5,000 to 20,000 passing vessels per year 
High:   > 20,000 passing vessels per year 
 
The degree of concentration should also be considered as there are some areas, such as the 
southern North Sea and Irish Sea, where the routes funnel down resulting in vessels passing in 
close proximity to platforms (17).  It is also essential to identify regular passing traffic (e.g. 
ferry operators, fishing organizations and regular shipping lines) and to consult with their 
representatives.  The local users should also be notified of the developments which follow.  
For busy areas, it may be required to assess how potential traffic route modifications due to 
the platform will impact the likelihood of vessel-vessel collisions (48).  
 
Data from Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) can be used to identify any changes in traffic 
patterns. 
4.2 Barriers (to prevent a collision course) 
A review of past collision incidents reveals that mechanical failure or inadequate 
watchkeeping on the vessel are the primary factors which can lead to a collision capable of 
causing catastrophic collapse of the platform.  Other than selecting the platform’s location 
during the design phase, the duty holder has little control over the likelihood of a collision. 
Because of the serious consequences of a collision to the platform and the workers on it, the 
offshore industry understands that it cannot depend solely on vessels to perform their 
responsibility of keeping out of the way.  As part of the platform’s overall collision risk 
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management strategy, the Duty Holder will have systems in place to provide early collision 
risk warnings (17).    
 
Barriers are risk control measures which reduce the collision risk by either decreasing the 
frequency or reducing the severity of a collision.  The barriers may be implemented on the 
vessel, the platform or the sea area.  However, the barriers on vessels are only effective if 
enforced by IMO (38). The barriers in this section are the result of literature survey and 
interviews with mariners and a specialist in collision risk management.  
4.2.1 Detection and Communication 
In the design phase, the requirements for detection of and communication with passing 
vessels should be addressed.  Depending upon the risk level of the platform, this could include 
high visibility paint, additional lighting, RACONS and/or AIS (48). 
 
Advances in technology have improved the detection for both the platform and the vessel 
watchkeepers and communications between the two.  For vessels that appropriately plan their 
voyage, GPS improves safety by allowing the vessel to quickly and accurately determine their 
position, velocity and heading in the open sea.  GPS also laid the foundation for electronic 
charts.  Updates such as the location of new platforms can automatically be made.  Situational 
awareness has been improved even further with AIS, which averts problems like target 
swapping and provides the name of the vessel. 
4.2.1.1 GPS  
The first experimental GPS satellite was launched in 1978; however it wasn’t until 1994 that 
the system was declared operational with 18 satellites.  Today there are 24 satellites.  New 
satellites have been launched to replace those which have reached the end or their life or 
malfunctioned (5).       
 
Before GPS, Loran-C (LOng RAnge Navigation) was the primary aid for vessel navigation.  
This system worked using a Loran-C receiver to pick up electronic pulses which were sent 
from onshore stations of a known location.  The latitude and longitude would automatically be 
calculated based on the time it took the signals to travel from the station to the vessel.  The 
disadvantage of this system was that operations were limited to coastal areas.   
 
The introduction of GPS revolutionized the way vessels navigated, by improving both the 
safety and efficiency levels for mariners.  It was now possible for mariners to quickly and 
accurately determine their position, speed, and heading in the open sea.  GPS can also be used 
to ensure compliance with regulations, such as the 500m safety zone around platforms.  This 
information can be used to aid the navigator in reaching his destination safely and in a timely 
manner (52).  However, smaller vessels with a lower standard of seamanship may have not 
installed GPS.  These types of ships are more likely to pose a collision risk (53).  
 
Differential GPS (DGPS) is an enhancement to the basic GPS signal which provides much 
higher level of precision. Many countries utilize the increased safety of DGPS for maritime 
operations such as locating and mapping out buoys and navigational hazards.  GPS and DGPS 
have laid the foundation for other technological advancements such as electronic charts and 
AIS.  Two additional civilian signals are planned in the future, which will improve the 
accuracy, availability and integrity (52). 
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4.2.1.2 Electronic Charts 
For centuries, paper nautical charts have been utilized by navigators.  Only recently has GPS 
positioning information enabled a computer based alternative.  The main advantage of 
electronic charts is that they can be automatically corrected with very little effort on the part 
of the navigator.  During a typical year, it is estimated that 10,000-15,000 manual corrections 
must be made by a navigator with a worldwide paper portfolio of 2,000-3000 charts.   
 
With electronic charts, the human error factor is also reduced since the alterations are inserted 
exactly as specified by the marine cartographer.  Furthermore, with the advent of electronic 
transmission the ship can receive the updated immediately.  The electronic system also allows 
for completely new charts to be transmitted to the ship.  It should be noted that this 
technology also allows for small corrections to be printed out onboard, thus making it quicker 
to update paper charts.  However, when collision models were developed, the system was 
paper based and it often took months for the corrections to reach a ship by post. 
 
Additional information, such as routes, notes and links to extra material can be overlaid on top 
of the electronic chart.  This information can be saved and retrieved when the vessel plans 
another route in the same area.  With paper charts, the information is erased after each use, 
making them subject to wear from general use.  With Navigation systems, such as GNSS 
(Global Navigation Satellite Systems), the ships position will be continuously plotted.  This 
eliminates the possibility of human plotting error (5).   
 
The main disadvantage of electronic charts is the screen size.  For an ECDIS system, the 
minimum approved size is 21 inches, which is one-sixth the size of a paper chart.  This 
problem can be overcome zooming and panning.  Also, display sizes over 40 inches are 
becoming more affordable.  A second disadvantage is the dependence on electronic 
equipment and the need for a power supply. For this reason, a backup chart system and 
emergency power supply are required (5).   
4.2.1.3 Automatic Identification System  
Traditionally, navigators use visual observation, audio exchanges, and radar to detect and 
avoid potential collisions.  However, in busy waters and in situations with limited visibility, it 
was a challenge to positively identify targets on the display.  But with the advent of 
transponders and advances in the maritime industries regulatory regime, automatic 
identification system (AIS) was introduces and vessels fitted with the appropriate equipment 
could be identified.   
 
As of December 31, 2004, all vessels larger than 300 GRT are obligated to be fitted with AIS.  
It is unlikely that AIS will ever replace radar, as there are some gaps where the type or size of 
a vessel falls outside of the SOLAS requirements. AIS information includes vessel 
identification, geographic location, vessel type, and cargo information which should be used 
as a complement to radar.  AIS improves the safety and efficiency of vessel navigation by 
fulfilling the following functional requirements (23): 
• Providing a clear warning of land and other fixed hazards 
• Enhancing traffic images and improving situation awareness 
• Aiding in collision avoidance by detecting floating and fixed hazards 
• Detecting floating and fixed navigational aids 
 
AIS provides and alternate way to obtain information for both navigation and collision 
avoidance strategies. AIS stations may be installed on a vessel, an offshore platform or on 
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land.   AIS operates on dedicated VHF frequencies using a transponder system that transmits 
and receives information from all other AIS stations within its coverage area in real-time.  
The vessels position, velocity and are automatically fed from the ship’s sensors to the AIS 
system.  (17).  
 
The typical range at which a platform can be viewed either visually of with radar is 12 nm.  
AIS offers a huge improvement in detection.  Although the horizontal range of Shipboard AIS 
transponders is highly variable, it is typically about 40 nm.  This allows significantly more 
time to asses if the vessel could be a threat to the platform and for earlier intervention (5).  
When used on platforms, it can reduce the collision risk by 10% (9). 
 
In order to keep the amount of information to a minimum, the different information types, 
“static”, “dynamic” or “voyage related” are updated at different rates.   The static and voyage 
related data are updated every 6 minutes, unless there is an outside request.  The dynamic data 
is updated more frequently based on the ship’s maneuvering condition.  The safety related 
messages are updated as needed. The information included for each of the various message 
types is (3): 
 
Static: 
• Maritime Mobile Service Identification (MMSI) number 
• IMO number (where available) 
• Call Sign and name 
• Length and beam 
• Type of ship (container, tanker, etc.) 
• Location of position fixing antenna (aft of bow, port or starboard of centerline) 
 Dynamic information: Dependant on speed and course alteration  
• Ship’s position with accuracy indication and integrity status;  
• Position time stamp (in UTC);  
• Course over ground (COG);  
• Speed over ground (SOG);  
• Heading;  
• Navigational status (e.g. NUC, at anchor, underway, aground etc. - this is input 
manually); and  
• Rate of turn (where available). 
• Angle of heel (optional and where available) 
• Pitch and roll (optional and where available)  
Voyage related information: Every 6 minutes, when is data amended, or on request  
• Ship’s draught;  
• Hazardous cargo type (if any);  
• Destination and ETA (at masters discretion); and  
• Route plan (waypoints). 
Short safety-related messages:  
• Free format text message - sent as required. 
 
MMSI is a unique number for each vessel that can be used to contact the specific vessel using 
Digital Selective Calling (DSC). 
 
Target swapping can occur with VTS radar plotting, which is when a two targets plotted by 
ARPA/ATA pass too close and each loses its tag to the other moving or static radar target.  
AIS can provides unambiguous identification of the targets and gives
swapping occurs.  The range of VHF transmissions is much longer than radar.  VHF also has 
a limited ability to transmit around corners, which means that AIS transmissions can be 
received in areas which are blind to radar
 
Figure
AIS can also be used to positively identify
sent to the onshore authorities.  Furthermore, with AIS, the bouy doesn’t physically need to be 
in the location to be viewed by vessels.  Virtual AIS allows for dangerous areas, such as a 
new wreck, to be marked on a vessel’s AIS display bef
installed.  
 
AIS information relies completely on GPS, which means that ground
not depend on sensors for processing.  For larger vessels equipped with AIS, course changes 
will be indicated at least 5 minutes sooner
 
AIS does not replace radar and is used as a complement to radar, by providing additional 
information.  AIS can be used in conjunction with radar to ensure th
sources match up.  AIS allows for vessel traffic areas which are currently not feasible by 
radar, due to geographical and/or cost reasons, to be monitored by onshore authorities.
AIS is not just for shore-based purposed and has a lot
 
Initial problems with AIS: 
• Poor bridge installation 
• Incorrect information being programmed
• Missing information 
• Lack of user training 
 
Vessel ‘A’ detects 
‘B’ by radar and 
AIS.  It is aware of 
‘C’ by AIS only 
 
Vessel ‘B’ 
detects ‘A’ 
by radar 
and AIS.  
It is aware 
of ‘C’ by 
AIS only  
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 as shown in Figure 4-3 (5).  
 4-3:Fjord effect (Based on (5)) 
 
 buoys.  If the buoy should move, an 
ore the real wreck marking buoy is 
-based information does 
 than with traditional ARPA/ATA (5). 
at the two information 
 to offer the navigator.  
 
Vessel ‘C’ 
is unaware 
of ‘A’ and 
‘B’ by radar 
 
 
 
alarm will be 
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Problems with AIS are similar to those which lead to ‘radar assisted collisions’.  However the 
AIS specifications in the IMO standards only intend to provide a device for the benefit of 
onshore purposes.  If it is not used as a navigational aid, then the navigator does not need to 
be trained in the benefits and limitations of the equipment. Newer vessels, from 2008, benefit 
from an integrated AIS and radar display. AIS provided more in depth information which 
assists in detecting and avoiding collisions (5).  A comparison on the anti-collision purposes 
of AIS and radar is given in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2: Anti-Collision Purposes of AIS and Radar (taken from (5))  
 AIS/VHF derived data ARPA/ATA radio derived 
data 
Overall accuracy Positional errors 10-30 
meters 
Similar to AIR at close range, 
but accuracy reduces linearly 
with range, due mainly to 
bearing accuracy 
Framework for calculations Ground based Relative to ship 
Derivation of aspect Obtained directly from 
compass of target ship (when 
available 
Derived by calculation and 
depends on accurate 
knowledge of own ship’s 
course and speed through 
water 
Detection of changes in target 
course and speed 
Immediate (when compass 
available), as soon as gyro 
starts to change,  Otherwise 
will be apparent when ground 
track changes 
Takes several minutes 
Identification of target size Good if static data is 
transmitted 
Can be misleading 
Changes with range and 
aspect 
Reliance on other equipment GPS system 
Sensors on other vessels 
Programming on other 
vessels 
All necessary equipment on 
ship 
Requires compass and log 
Reliability of detecting other 
vessels in the vicinity 
Only if fitted with AIS 
Not significantly weather 
dependant 
Dependent on echo strength 
and weather conditions 
Target swap No Possible 
Interference and false echoes Unlikely A possibility 
Reduced coverage due to 
own-ship obstructions 
Unlikely Can occur depending on 
aerial position 
Reduced coverage due to 
land mass 
Unlikely Yes, line of sight only 
Range Typically 20-40 miles 
depending on aerial heights 
and environmental factors 
Typically 10-20 miles 
depending on aerial heights 
and environmental factors 
Transmission and target 
response density causing 
overload 
A possibility Unlikely 
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AIS is a relatively new development and it does have its limitations.  The AIS location 
accuracy depends on the accuracy of the underlying subsystem (i.e. GPS).  The AIS 
information must be manually updated periodically by the navigator, otherwise, erroneous 
information will be transmitted and there is no way for the recipient to verify the integrity of 
the information, other than calling up the vessel in question.  There are a limited number of 
slots for transmitting messages, which could be a problem in busy areas.  Around the UK, 
monitoring of early AIS use indicated that many targets either did not transmit an AIS 
signature or transmitted incorrect and/or missing data.  Port and cargo information generally 
experienced a high error rate.  In a 2007 study, 94 vessels were inspected and the vessel type 
was entered incorrectly in 74%, the ship length was incorrect in 47%, the navigational status 
was wrong in 30%, and the ship beam value was incorrect in 18% of the vessels (30). 
    
AIS must be used as a complement to radar.  As mentioned earlier, AIS is a ‘cooperative’ 
system and not all vessels are required to be fitted with AIS.  Radar does not require any 
action by the vessel in order for it to be detected.  Furthermore debris and other floating 
objects will not appear to the AIS.  But if the radar is being operated in ‘sea stabilized’ 
relative motion, which is a preferred display and operating mode for many mariners, there is 
the potential for radar and AIS information to be mismatched (17).   
 
At this point, the extent to which AIS technology will be utilized for collision risk warning 
and management remains to be fully proven.  It is a corporative system and it is dependent on 
the captain to input the correct data.  There is the possibility that erroneous data could lead to 
further problems.  It would be interesting to survey navigators to determine how reliance on 
new technology has changed navigational practices (17).   
4.2.1.4 Radar 
Radar assists in collision avoidance by providing an indication of the position of passing 
vessels in relation to the platform.  Radar operation can be a very demanding task in 
congested waters where the operator has may targets to monitor.  Conversely, in waters with 
little traffic, maintaining vigilance is also a challenge.  Detection of targets can fail due to 
weak signal, signal noise, no warning, boredom or lack of breaks.  But with improvements in 
technology, the task of monitoring radar had been substantially eased (5). 
 
In recent years, radar has become enhanced with increasing digital information.  Automatic 
Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) provides target tracking information, speed and Closest Point of 
Approach (CPA), and the time of the closest point of approach (TCPA) alerting the platform 
of a danger of collision with a passing ship.  When GPS was linked to radar a target’s true 
course over ground (COG) and speed over ground (SOG) could be calculated and displayed.  
With the advent of digital charts, radar images could be enhanced by overlaying them on an 
electronic chart.  As mentioned earlier, AIS is also used as an enhancement to marine radar 
(5). 
4.2.1.5 VTS 
Collision risks can be reduced by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), which provides active 
monitoring and navigational advice for vessels.  VTS is an integrated part of StatoilHydro’s 
emergency response center.  In Norway, the StatoilHydro Marin provides ocean monitoring 
services for 51 StatoilHydro installations.  They are able to monitor 80% of the NCS 
petroleum activity by radar.  AIS transponders are used in the identification of vessels from a 
distance of 40 nm. VTS is able to alert installations of a vessel on collision course within an 
hour estimated impact.  Their objective is to identify and warn ships on a course towards an 
installation.  VTS coordinates all offshore SV, ERRV and guard vessels.   
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Many VTS stations have radars, and the addition of AIS offers a number of positive benefits.  
The Statoil Hydro Marine surveillance consists of 50 integrated radars, 10 AIS transponders, 
and 19 VHF stations.  As shown in Figure 4-4, there is a significant overlap of the radar 
coverage, which offers optimal target detection. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: StatoilHydro Marin Radar Coverage (20) 
 
VTS data may also be used during accident investigations.  For example, the captain of the 
Grane told the investigation team that the ships speed was 1.5-2 knots just before impact; 
however, records from Statoil Marin indicate that the boat's speed at the collision ranged from 
2 -7 knots, and was probably a few less than 7 knots (34). 
 
VTS can also assist with data collection.  Monitoring by VTS plays a main role in Norway’s 
RNNP project.  As shown in Figure 4-5, collision trends such as "major accident DFU vessel 
on a collision course” can be measured with more accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Number of ships on a collision course in relation to the number of facilities monitored by 
Sandsli VTS (36) 
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4.2.2 Platform Barriers 
Passing vessels could cause immediate catastrophic damage, but other than location, an 
platform has very little control over the risk posed by passing vessels.  In the North Sea, 
platforms are equipped with foghorns and strobe lights (48).  
4.2.2.1 Design 
In the North Sea, the material and welding standards for platforms have improved over the 
years.  Often the platforms are ranked based on the year they were designed and constructed.  
The main differences in the various generations are (16): 
• First generation: Standard Charpy tests, but few material properties requirements 
• Second generation: Higher fatigue life requirements for joints 
• Third generation: CTOD requirements for steel and welding procedures  
 
Without reserve buoyancy a rig would be expected to fail with an impact energy of 20 to 
25 MJ.  The RABL project showed that upper-deck reserve buoyancy could enable a rig to 
survive an impact energy of 60 to 70 MJ.  Although this is significantly higher, this additional 
protection would only be effective for smaller passing vessels.  At this time it is not possible 
to protect a platform from a collision with a larger merchant vessel (15).    
4.2.2.2 Promulgation & Safety Zone 
The existence of a platform must be broadcast to the marine industry both in advance of and 
continuously after emplacement.  Early warnings should include consulting with regular local 
traffic.  Navigational warnings may also be broadcast by radio as well as fortnightly bulletins 
for the fishing industry via Kingfisher Information Services (KIS).  In the case of mobile 
platforms, rig move warnings should be given. 
 
After emplacement, the location of the platform should be marked on paper and electronic 
navigational charts.  AIS or RACON will aid in warning vessels. The navigational warnings 
should be repeated regularly and additional notices should be given to mariners.  FishSafe or a 
similar fish plotter database should be used to warn the fisherman of underwater structures.  
Advances in technology have also improved promulgation.  Digital Selective Calling (DSC) 
may be used to send safety messages from the platform or the support vessel followed Very 
High Frequency (VHF) radio messages.  It may also be necessary to have dedicated guard 
vessels on location. 
 
All platforms are protected by safety zones, which is 500m radius around each platform.  
Masters of the passing vessel are responsible for remaining outside of the safety zone, but the 
dutyholders have only a limited ability to enforce this requirement (48). There are numerous 
accounts of vessels illegally entering the safety zone for various reasons: 
• Some vessels use the platform as a waypoint  
• Unaware of platform 
• Curious about the platform 
 
The current models consider vessels which use the platform as a navigational mark or which 
approach out of curiosity to be under full control.  Unless they experience a power or steering 
failure and start to drift towards the platform, they are not considered to be a collision hazard 
(9).  Although this barrier may provide some protection if the platform is known, in the case 
of passing vessels that have not successfully completed the voyage planning, the safety zone 
is assumed to offer no protection. 
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4.2.2.3 EERV 
Traditionally, the primary source of monitoring passing vessels and appraising the collision 
risks is the ERRV or its predecessor, the SBV.  For many platforms, the EERVs are still 
utilized to detect approaching vessels.  As discussed in previous sections, AIS can compensate 
for many radars shortcomings, but the enhanced capabilities are only effective if the 
approaching vessel is also equipped with AIS (17).  
 
Because safe navigation can be interpreted as a threat, many SBV are reluctant to warn the 
platform is a passing vessel is more than 30 minutes away.  However, the platforms 
emergency response plans are time critical (19).  With AIS, the SBV can contact the passing 
vessel by name to better assess the threat.  It would be useful to survey ERRVs to determine 
how their approach to contacting passing vessels has changed with the introduction of AIS   
4.2.3 Vessel Specific Barriers 
In addition to the aforementioned technical barriers, there have been changes in company 
attitudes and policies in response to accidents.  For example, 20 years ago, it would have been 
acceptable for a captain to enjoy a few alcoholic drinks ashore before commencing on a 
voyage.  Today, there is a zero tolerance policy for alcohol use.  Some companies offer 
counseling and treatment options (42). 
 
To confirm the presence of the captain on the bridge, some newer vessels have an alarm that 
sounds every 12 minutes and if the captain does not acknowledge it, an alarm will sound on 
the entire vessel after 3 minutes (42).  As this type of alarm becomes more common, it must 
be taken into account by the models, which include an absence from the bridge of 20 minutes 
or more to be a factor in collision risk.   
 
Fatigue is also recognized as a problem.  The common rotation pattern is 6 hours on, 6 hours 
off.  But 8-8-4-4 rotation plans are also being tried out.  Reductions in the vibration levels 
aboard newer vessels will also improve the quality of the crews rest periods.  Although 
checklists only take a few minutes to complete, some captains neglect them.  But attitudes are 
changing and more captains are starting to see their value (42). 
 
A shipping company must be careful to perform background checks.  As long as the captain 
holds a license, he can find a job, even if his safety record is flawed.  Another potential 
problem area is the amount of paperwork that a captain is expected to complete (42).  This 
was one of the causal factors which lead to MV Jork colliding with Viking Echo Delta facility 
in 2007 (50).   
4.2.3.1 Ship Class 
Classification Societies are independent bodies which issue a class certificate verifying that 
the vessel meets a standard for design, maintenance and repair.  It is used as a quality check 
for insurance companies and is the basis for negotiating insurance rates.  The owner can select 
from 40 societies for the class and associated services.  Because the owner is paying, there 
can be a trade-off between cost and safety.  Figure 4-6 shows the variation of detention rates 
for different classification societies.  
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Figure 4-6: Detention Rate in % for classification societies compared to the average rate (32) 
 
4.3 Top Event 
For purposes of organizing the barriers that must fail in order for the collision to occur, the 
top event is a vessel on collision course.  Once the threat of a potential collision has been 
identified, the OIM will have a short time to assess many concerns including the 
following (48): 
• Options available to establish communications with the vessel 
• If the vessel is under power or drifting  
o If under power, is the vessel’s route normal or has been affected by marine 
traffic? 
o If drifting, is the drift controlled? 
• Other vessels in the area that could assist 
• Velocity of vessel and estimated time to collision 
• When the platform must take action 
• Size of the vessel and its potential impact energy 
• How weather conditions effect the vessel and the impact on evacuation 
• Vulnerability of the likely point of impact 
• When operations should be shut down 
• When evacuation should commence 
4.4 Barriers (after collision course is identified) 
Although the platform operator and its attendant vessel have little control the collision 
potential for a passing vessel, if the errant vessel can be warned in sufficient time, it may be 
possible it influence the outcome of the event.  
4.4.1 Emergency Response Plans 
Each platform should have a concise emergency procedure in place for when a passing vessel 
poses a collision risk to the platform.  The parameters for activating the emergency response 
plans are determined as part of the Safety Case risk assessment. The parameters may include: 
• Distance until the CPA 
• Expected time until vessel passes through safety zone 
• Failed communications 
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• Expected time until impact 
 
The plan should distinguish between drifting and powered vessel threats, as this will 
significantly affect the time available before expected impact.  In addition to the 
considerations listed in section 4.3, the contingency plan should include (48):   
• Responsibilities for detection, communication and assessment of the hazard 
• When to alert the platform of the threat 
• In the case of a drifting vessel, the decision points for carrying out a controlled 
shutdown and evacuation  
• Actions of the SBV(s) in the event of an imminent threat  
• How the predicted impact point and weather conditions will affect the evacuation plan 
 
Modern technology improves the accuracy of the time estimates.  It can take several minutes 
for changes in the targets course and velocity to be detected by radar, but with AIS the 
changes are detected instantaneously (26).  In almost all ship on collision course situations 
evacuation will be executed.  This will of course be more often than actual collisions. The 
frequency of evacuation is assumed to be twice as large as the frequency of collision. It is 
assumed that in 5% of the ship on collision course situations that the platform is not 
evacuated, which may be due to (9): 
• The vessel not being detected 
• Bad weather conditions 
• Misjudgment of the situation, etc.  
4.4.2 Dedicated Standby Vessels 
Every ERRV must be able to participate in the platform’s collision avoidance strategy as 
required by the duty holder, such as monitoring the 500m safety zone, warning approaching 
vessels and platforms of collision risk, and preventing them when possible (31). 
 
 When AIS is linked to the ECDIS, the probability of the watchkeeper on the ERRV 
successfully identifying and contacting an errant vessel by VHF radio is increased.  
Furthermore, as the SBV is able to approach an incoming vessel applying maritime light and 
sound signals.  This should reduce the effects of failure modes, such as “distraction by a non-
routine event”, “absorbed in secondary tasks”, “incompetent”, “asleep on bridge”, 
“incapacitated” and “impaired”.  Further explanation of these failure modes is found in 
section 4.6.    
4.4.3 Digital selective calling (DSC) 
The platform OIM and/or VTS will want to establish contact with the vessel once it has been 
identified as being on a collision course.  In the past this could have been a problem if the 
navigator was absent from the bridge, or the calls may have been ignored if the navigator did 
not consider it to be important.  But AIS has eased the difficulty of contacting an errant 
vessel.     
One of the safety related pieces of information transmitted in AIS is the Maritime Mobile 
Service Identities (MMSI).  This unique nine digit number can be used to contact the specific 
vessel using Digital Selective Calling (DSC).  By using a VHF DSC controller, a GMDSS 
alarm will go off and the warning will be broadcast on a working frequency.  The captain on 
the errant vessel must return to the bridge to silence the alarm and at that point, he will also 
hear the warning.  If the navigator has disabled the alarm or does not respond to it, there are 
still other options.  AIS should list the name of the navigator’s supervisor.  This piece of 
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information can be used to look up and call the supervisors INMARSAT-B (satellite 
communications) number.  Usually there is an INMARSAT-B extension in the captains office 
and if the captain is in his office he will most likely answer the phone and redirect the vessel 
to avoid the collision (25).     
4.5 Range of consequences 
An assessment of the consequences of a vessel-platform collision is outside of the scope of 
this paper, but for continuity, a brief list of the possible consequences is given below.  These 
consequences should be used to evaluate the need for additional safety measures.   
• Fatalities and injuries  
• Total collapse of the platform  
• Ignition 
• Environmental damage due to released hydrocarbons 
• Lost production  
• Damaged reputation 
• Glancing blow 
• Collision averted 
 
When investigating an incident, the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) will be retrieved and 
played back.  This box contains a record of the 24 hours prior to collision.  It is possible for 
AIS data to be logged in the VDR which could be useful for the analysis (17). 
4.6 Implications for Existing Models 
As technology is improved, it is important that the fault trees and underlying assumptions for 
the vessel- platform collision scenarios are updated.  Human errors may play a significant role 
in collisions today, but with advances in technology it may be possible to design out human 
error.  This section is largely inspired by A Guide to Practical Human Reliability Assessment 
(24).  In the fault tree shown in Figure 4-7, the top event is ‘inadequate watchkeeping’, which 
is a common failure models for most models.  The impact of modern technology on the basic 
event which could lead to a watch-keeping failure is discussed below. 
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Figure 4-7: Fault Tree for Inadequate Watchkeeping (24) 
 
Watch-keeper distracted by a non-routine event 
This description is used for a minor emergency which causes the watch-keeper to become 
distracted on the bridge.  If the vessel is equipped with AIS, it is possible for the platform or 
VTS to positively identify the vessel and to contact the watch-keeper well in advance of the 
collision.  With GPS, the watchkeeper has a better awareness of the vessels location, velocity 
and heading. 
 
Watch-keeper absorbed in secondary task  
In this case, the watch-keeper may become absorbed in a secondary task, such as preparing 
documentation for each port, and fail to realize the amount of time that has passed by.  More 
modern vessels include an alarm which will go off on the bridge every 12 minutes to confirm 
the presence of the navigator.  Should the watch-keeper be distracted by other tasks, this 
alarm will remind him of how much time has passed.   
 
If the watchkeeper should still be so absorbed that he fails to survey his surroundings every 12 
minutes, AIS makes it easier for the platform of VTS to contact the vessel.    
 
Watch-keeper incompetent:  
This event includes inadequate watch-keeping performance which may be due to lack of 
experience or manning problems.  Certain advances in technology such as ECDIS, should 
make it easier for the watchkeeper to perform his tasks; however, AIS may still be used to 
contact the watchkeeper if he is unaware of a collision course. 
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Watch-keeper asleep on bridge  
The watch-keeper may fall asleep on the bridge due to prolonged watch-keeping duties and 
excessive fatigue.  As mentioned earlier, modern vessels include an alarm which will go off 
on the bridge every 12 minutes to confirm the presence of the navigator.  Although this alarm 
may alert the navigator, depending on the level of fatigue, he may immediately fall back 
asleep.   
 
Watch-keeper incapacitated by accident or illness  
The watch-keeper may become injured on the job and it may go undiscovered until the next 
watch-keeper comes on duty. 
 
 Watch-keeper incapacitated by alcohol 
Attitudes about alcohol have changed in the last 20 years.  Many shipping companies have 
zero tolerance policies regarding alcohol use and make counseling available to crew with 
problems.  
 
Watch-keeper absent from bridge:  
The watch-keeper leaves the bridge for a short time either to eat, go to the toilet, shift change. 
 
Watch-keeper performance impaired 
Excessive fatigue resulting in reduced effectiveness of the watch-keeper.  Different working 
rotation schedules, such as 8 on-8 off-4on-4off may improve the performance of the watch-
keeper.  Lower vibration levels in newer vessels will also improve the quality of the watch-
keeper’s rest. 
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5 Accident Models 
If the decision is made to undertake a new model to estimate the passing vessel-platform 
collision frequency, there are different modeling theories to consider:  
• The sequence of events model 
• The epidemiological model  
• The systemic model   
 
The model is selected based upon how the accidents are believed to have occurred.  The 
sequence of events model views the accident as a chain of events, where one event causes the 
next, and so on, until the failure occurs.  The epidemiological model takes the view that there 
are factors which trigger the unknown failures in management decisions, procedures, 
equipment design, etc.  The systemic model views an accident as a normal part of the system, 
which occurs as a result of imperfect knowledge and resource constraints (8).     
5.1 Sequence-of-events model 
The sequence-of-events model, also referred to as the domino model, tells a simple story of 
what is needed to cause an accident.  It is based on one problem leading to the next and that 
all events in the sequence are needed for the failure to occur.  The assumption is that the 
events occur in a specific order and by removing one of the events in the series the accident 
will be averted.  But, this is hardly ever the case.  The pathway is easy to represent graphically 
as shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: sequence of event leading to collision course (based on (8)) 
 
For sequence of events models, it is believed that placing a barrier will prevent the accident 
from occurring as shown in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2: Blocking pathway to prevent collision course (based on (8))                  
 
But the collision course may have several patterns of causes, and putting one countermeasure 
in place somewhere along the pathway to failure may not be enough as shown in Figure 5-3.    
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Figure 5-3: Subtle vulnerabilities leave opportunities for the failure to occur (based on (8)) 
 
When developing barriers, it is crucial to understand all of the weaknesses in the system 
(management, resources, etc) that could contribute to the collision course.  This model type is 
not ideal because the chain is subjective and as further improvements in technology are made 
the pathways will continue to change. 
 
The sequence-of-events model does not assist in the understanding of the organizational 
factors.  When backtracking through the series of events, humans are often identified as the 
root cause or weak link in the chain.  Current collision models are sequence-of-events 
accident models.  They are based on fault trees and event trees, which may not account 
adequately for the complexity of modern socio-technical systems. 
5.2 Epidemiological model 
The epidemiological model views accidents as a combination of hidden errors within the blunt 
end that are activated by unsafe acts committed by the sharp end.  This model views human 
error as an indication of a deeper problem.  The accidents are believed to be prevented by 
identifying and removing the latent error or ensuring that they do not get activated.  It offers 
the possibility of more complex connections between the various factors, but the signature 
image of the model, shown in Figure 5-4, is similar to the sequence-of-events model.   
   
 
Figure 5-4: Epidemical Model – Accidents Occur When Latent and Active Failures Align (8) 
 
Epidemiological models help with identifying the organizational factors, but there is little 
evidence that failures occur in this way.  This type of model does not explain the interaction 
between the active and latent failures, or how and why the holes align.  When identifying 
hidden failures, creativity can lead to everything within the organization being interpreted as a 
potential error.  Although the model could be useful during accident investigations, it is less 
meaningful for making predictions.       
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5.3 Systemic Accident Model 
The systemic accident model is based on the point of view that if the individuals had foreseen 
the failure, they would have reacted differently.  Rather than just focus on human or 
mechanical error, this model takes into account the socio-technical system that shaped the 
conditions for the people and equipment performance.  The systemic approach focuses on the 
performance of the system as a whole, not just the parts as the previous two models discussed.  
Rather than look for holes, this view attempts to understand why the actions made sense to the 
people involved in the accident at all levels of the organization.  
 
Systemic models build on two primary principles: emergence and control.  Safety is 
considered to be an emergent property that can only be determined by evaluating how the 
system components interact within the larger system.  The control or constraints on the system 
are based on prior ideas (probably incorrect) of how the components interact.  Because 
systems are dynamic, as time passes, the margins allotted for the initial controls or constraints 
become narrower. Accidents are seen as the byproduct of a normal system, which occur when 
the control or enforcement of safety related constraints become inadequate.       
 
Because they do not rely on cause and effect relationships to explain the interactions behind 
the failure, systemic models better represent the complexity behind the system.  Of course, the 
models are also more complex.  
5.3.1 Application of Systemic Accident Model for Vessel-Platform Collision 
As a result of the increasing intricacy of socio-technical systems and the variability of human 
performance to accommodate the complexity, collisions should be considered a normal 
occurrence.  Systemic models might be better suited for the dynamic nature of marine 
operations.  There are Monte Carlo simulation tools available which are flexible enough to 
achieve realistic behavior of the vessel traffic passing by the platform.  
 
It is outside of the scope of this thesis to develop a new model; however, this section presents 
an example of how a systemic accident model could be developed to measure the risk of a 
passing vessel collision.  The methodology presented below is based upon the TOPAZ 
(Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) method which was developed by 
researchers at NLR.  TOPAZ is normally applied to aircraft traffic management, which like 
the maritime industry involves multiple interactions between the operators and the technical 
systems.  
 
The steps in the TOPAZ safety risk assessment cycle include (45): 
• Step 0: Defining the scope, level of detail, safety context and objective of the of the 
assessment 
• Step 1: Construct a complete outline of the process 
• Step 2: Identifying the associated hazards 
• Step 3: Develop relevant safety scenarios 
• Step 4: Rank the severity of each scenario 
• Step 5: Determine the frequency of each scenario 
• Step 6: Asses the risk tolerances for each scenario 
• Step 7: Identify the primary sources of unacceptable risk for each scenario 
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Step 0: 
The objectives are to be identified.  This should be done in close cooperation with both the 
safety agencies and the maritime industry.  For the example presented in this section, the 
scope was only to identify collision risk for a specific platform.     
 
Step 1: 
A concise outline of the system must be developed.  As shown in Figure 5-5, the vessel- 
platform collision model can be viewed as a system composed of the following four elements: 
vessel, platform, external conditions, and VTS.  With the exception of external conditions, the 
operating policies for each element will define how they interrelate.    
 
 
Figure 5-5: Four main elements of vessel-platform model 
 
Step 2: 
Hazards scenarios for each element are identified, such as: avoidance planning is not used, 
navigator is not effectively keeping watch, navigator is not tuned to VTS frequency, etc.   
 
Step 3: 
The intricacies of each hazard and resulting interactions between elements are to be defined.  
The subsections that follow describe the logic behind a possible structure for the new model.  
The starting point for the model is the location of the platform, which will determine the 
number of vessels per year that are expected to pass.  Another significant factor is the number 
of years the platform will be present 
  
Steps 4 and 5: 
Identifying the severities and assess the frequencies for each element.  For example, the 
frequency experiencing rain and sea clutter will be dependent on the external condition.  
Radar clutter will affect the ability of the vessel to detect a platform, but the severity of clutter 
will be lessened if the platform and vessel are equipped with an AIS transponder.  
     
At this point, a systemic accident model could be constructed using a Monte Carlo simulation 
tool.  Essentially, an infinite number of passing vessel scenarios would be generated, as 
shown in Figure 5-6.  The values of the initial conditions are assigned randomly for each run 
based on their probability of occurrence. Each scenario would be unique, but all could 
potentially happen.   
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Figure 5-6: Monte Carlo ship-collision model 
 
The model should allow the user to filter the specifics of any simulated accident based upon 
all input and output criteria.  This will include the location of the platform, meteorological and 
hydraulic conditions, the velocity and size of the vessel, and the geometry of the impact.  The 
output of the model should reflect the range of outcomes:  
• collision is averted 
• vessel crosses the safety zone 
• glancing blow 
• passing vessel colliding at full speed 
 
Steps 6 and 7: 
Assess the risk tolerance and identify the safety bottlenecks.  An example of this is shown in 
Figure 5-7.  The collision scenarios must be sorted from lowest to highest impact energy.  The 
blue line represents the frequency of which the impact energy either occurs or is exceeded.  
The cut-off criterion of 10-4 may be used to establish the annual frequency limit (53).   
 
 
Figure 5-7: Example, Exceedance Frequency for Passing Vessel Collision Risk 
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5.3.1.1 External Conditions 
The external conditions are not considered to be a direct cause for a vessel-platform collision; 
however, they will influence the ability to detect a potential collision.  For example, in poor 
visibility situations, the detection will be completely dependent upon surveillance equipment.  
The subsystem for external conditions is shown in Figure 5-8.   
 
In this example, only natural phenomena are included in the external conditions.  Another 
factor that could be considered is the impact of other platforms in the area.  Depending upon 
the platform’s location, other platforms could increase the likelihood of a collision or provide 
a shielding effect.   
 
 
Figure 5-8: External Conditions subsystem 
 
Tag Description 
1 It is important to have the accurate meteorological and hydraulic data for each 
platform if the model is used to capture collision risk for more than one asset or if a 
generic model is developed. 
 
EC-1 Past and present data from weather stations in the North Sea can be found using a 
climate database.  As mentioned earlier, Norwegian meteorological institute 
implemented a free data policy in September 2007 and consequently weather and 
ocean data are available for free (28). 
  
The model will use this data to randomly generate the external conditions for each 
simulation.  Based upon these conditions, the visibility, traffic density, stability and 
maneuverability of the vessel would be affected.  These conditions would be used as 
an input for the other systems. 
 
2 The external conditions may impact the ability of vessel to detect the platform.  The 
motion and maneuverability of the vessel is affected by the external conditions.  The 
watchkeeper and crew’s behavior may also be affected and crew members could 
become sick.   
 
3 The external conditions may impact the ability of VTS to monitor the platform.  
 
4 The external conditions may impact the ability of platform to detect the vessel.  The 
watchkeeper and crews behavior may also be affected. 
5.3.1.2 Platform 
The location of the platform will be decided in the design phase.
opportunity to influence the risk of collision, as 
determined by the location.  The availability of 
subsystem for platform is shown in
 
 
Tag Description 
1 The location of the platform will be determined during the design phase.
platform evaluated by the model, the external conditions, VTS 
traffic will be influenced by the location. 
 
4 The external conditions will influence blocks P
 
5 In addition to the platform and/or the ERRV, 
arrow indicates VTS alerting the 
 
6 The availability of VTS to monitor the 
 
7 The location will influence the
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  This will be the first 
the volume of passing traffic
VTS is also based on the location
 Figure 5-9.  
Figure 5-9: Platform subsystem 
monitoring
 
-3, P-4 and P-5.   
VTS may be monitoring the area.  This 
platform of a vessel on collision course.
platform depends on location. 
 types of vessels that will pass this location.
 will be 
. The 
 
  For each 
, and vessel 
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Tag Description 
8 This arrow represents the affect that the warning aids will have on the vessel when the 
emergency response plan is initiated. 
 
11 If the navigator has failed to plan the voyage sufficiently, there are various ways that 
the platform can make itself known to passing traffic: radar beacons, AIS transponder, 
promulgation, and/or age.  This arrow represents the vessels knowledge of the 
platform based upon the aids used. 
 
P-1 The location of the platform is selected in the design phase.  The operator has the 
greatest ability to influence the platform’s collision risk when selecting a location. 
 
P-2 The model for the performance of the ERRV accounts for visual monitoring, 
communication with passing vessels and platform, and conflict detection and reaction.  
In clear visibility conditions, monitoring may include visual observation. In dense fog 
conditions, radar and AIS will be the primary means of detection.  If a collision course 
is detected the ERRV/SBV must notify the platform and be prepared to assist with 
carrying out the emergency response plan.  The ERRV/SBV’s availability to 
participate in the emergency response plan may depend on if it is being shared with 
other platforms in the area. 
 
P-3 
a/b 
Radar / AIS monitoring is perhaps done on the platform, by a SBV, and/or by VTS.  
The SBV is considered to be part of the platform system.  Once the vessel is identified 
as a possible threat and the platform is informed, the Emergency Response Plan 
begins. 
 
P-4 
a/b 
The external conditions may influence the habits of the watchkeeper and crew.  For 
example, in warm, sunny weather the crew may choose to spend their free time 
outside or on the deck.  But, for the observations of the crew to have any impact on 
reducing collision risk, they must feel comfortable reporting any unusual vessels to 
the OIM/watchkeeper.  Hence, a safety culture must exist within the organization at 
every level. 
  
P-5 
a/b 
Visibility Conditions must be defined for the model.  For example: 
• Visibility Condition 1: Greater than 4km 
• Visibility Condition 2: 200m-4km 
• Visibility Condition 3: Less than 200m 
 
P-6/ 
P-7 
The emergency response plan will only be initiated if the platform detects the errant 
vessel or if the ERRV or VTS informs the platform of the risk posed by a passing 
vessel.  There may be a time delay as the ERRV or VTS will try to contact the vessel 
before contacting the platform. 
 
P-8/ 
P-9 
The platform will need to be shutdown and evacuate if it is under threat from a vessel 
on a collision course.  The success of these actions will depend upon the time 
available. 
 
P-10/ 
P-11/ 
P-12/ 
Once the emergency response plan is initiated, there are warning aids integrated into 
the platform, such as Radio/VHF and Light & Sound.  Depending upon the time 
available and location, other resources, such as helicopters and stand-by vessels in the 
Tag Description 
P-13 area may be identified 
collision will be improved each available aid.
 
P-14/ 
P-15/ 
P-16/ 
P-17 
The likelihood of a collision course will be reduced if the vessel is aware of the 
platforms existence.  If the voyage planning was insufficient, t
combination of promulgation
vessel traffic, the age of the platform will also influence the navigator’s awareness of 
it. 
5.3.1.3 VTS 
The model of the VTS system provides position, velocity, and heading estimates for the 
vessel.   
 
Tag Description 
3 External Conditions can impact the performance of the surveillance equipment.
 
6 The location of the platform
 
9 The technical state of the vessel will impact its ability to be detected and contacted.
 
10 If an errant vessel is detected, VTS will attempt to contact the captain.
 
VTS-1 The location of the platform will determine if the 
surveillance of VTS.  If VTS is not available, this subsystem will not be included.
 
VTS-
2/3 
Surveillance equipment
relevant if the area is monitored by CCTV.
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and asked for assistance.  The likelihood of averting the 
 
his can be achieved by a 
, AIS transponder and/or radar beacon.  For regular 
Figure 5-10: VTS subsystem 
 will determine if VTS monitoring is available.
  
platform will be under the 
 is similar to the description for P-3.  Visibility is considered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VTS-4 The number of vessels under sur
errant vessel.  Perhaps a new model could be used to understand how the optimum 
number of operators needed to monitor the area.
 
VTS-5 The ability to identify the errant vessel
vessel and if the surveillance equipment is functioning properly.  
5.3.1.4 Vessel 
The vessel’s navigator is responsible for planning and executing the voyage safely.  The 
subsystem for the vessel should include the elements that could lead to a 
 
 
Tag Description 
2 The impact of external conditions on the vessel.  Sea and weather conditions could 
affect the accuracy of radar equipment, stability o
cause sea sickness.  Problems such as sea clutter could affect the vessels ability to 
detect the platform.  Rough external condi
vessel. 
 
Perhaps VTS data might
‘waiting on weather’.   
 
Under ideal weather conditions, the crew may be more likely to be on the deck.  But, 
for this to translate to a re
where they feel like they could question the navigator’s actions. 
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veillance may impact the ability of VTS to detect an 
 
 is based on the technical standard
 
collision course. 
Figure 5-11: Vessel subsystem 
f vessel, watchkeeping behavior, and 
tions could affect the maneuverability of the 
 show a seasonal variance in the number of vessels 
duction of collision risk, the crew must be in an environment 
 
 of the 
   
 
due to 
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7 If data from VTS is available, the probability distribution of (Black/Gray/White) list 
flags and the (small/medium/large) size category should be included.  Otherwise, 
these variables should be estimated.   
 
9 The technical state of the vessel will impact its ability to be detected and contacted. 
 
8/10 The model for the communications system between the passing vessel and the 
VTS/ERRV.  Communication attempts are assumed to immediately follow the 
detection of the collision course.  The model should account for delay or failure of the 
DCS.  
 
11 If the navigator is aware of the platform, either through familiarity or promulgation, 
he will generally plan to avoid a collision. 
 
V-1 The volume and type of traffic passing by the platform will be based on the location.  
The vessel flag/size/age/etc. would be selected at random based upon VTS data, or 
other available data.  If the external conditions for the simulation run are poor 
weather/visibility, then the vessel should be traveling at lower speeds.  But if the 
traffic density is low or if there are pressures from the ship owner, the vessel could be 
navigating at unsafe speeds.  The percentage of vessels operating irresponsibly in poor 
weather may be acquired from surveys or assumed.     
 
The model of the passing vessel represents the vessel movements (acceleration, 
constant speed, deceleration, turning) during transit.  Size categories for the vessels 
must be defined for the model e.g.:  
• 0-1500 dwt 
• 1500-5000 dwt 
• 5000 - 15000 dwt 
• 15000 – 40000 dwt 
• > 40000 dwt 
 
Because flags of convenience are more likely to have lower standards and higher 
accident rates, it is important to take the model takes the flag state into account.  The 
Paris MoU ranks the quality Flag States on a “Black, Grey and White list”. 
• Black List: Poor performers that are considered high risk 
• Gray List: Average Performers 
• White List: quality flags with low detention records 
 
 
V-2 The technical state of vessel will be based on the size and flag state.   
 
V-3 The vessel’s maneuverability is related to its size. 
 
V-4 
a/b 
The model for the performance of the navigator(s) during the voyage includes tasks 
such as auditory monitoring, visual monitoring, vessel control, and collision course 
detection and reaction. The model should include dynamic representations of the 
captain’s situation awareness and the competence of the pilot. 
 
V-5 The competency of the navigator will correspond to appropriate voyage planning. 
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a/b 
 
V-6 
a/b 
Physical Health  
The physical health of the navigator will affect his ability to perform.  Poor eyesight 
may lead to oversight of obstacles.  More serious conditions could leave the navigator 
incapacitated and without a lookout until the next shift comes to relieve him.   
 
Perhaps if the ship owner requires the navigator to have a physical exam, deficiencies 
in health could be identified and treated. 
 
V-7/ 
V-8/ 
V-9 
 
Similar to P-3, P-4 and P-5.   
 
V-10 VTS, ERRV and/or the platform will attempt to contact the errant vessel once it is 
detected.  But communications may not be achieved for a number of reasons such as a 
technical error or the navigator may be absent or incapacitated.  If the navigator is on 
the bridge, he may disregard the warnings if he fails to understand the severity of the 
situation. 
  
V-11 In some instances, the collision course may not be detected or the vessel may not be 
respond to communication attempts.  But, the vessel could still recover spontaneously.  
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6 Discussion  
Accurately quantifying the risks of ship-platform collision has been a goal of the petroleum 
industry for many years, but technological advances have been made which are not reflected 
by the current models.  New modeling theories have been developed which are better suited to 
capture the complexities of modern socio-technical systems.     
 
This thesis set out to answer the following questions: 
 
Have improvements in technology reduced the frequency of passing vessel-platform 
collisions? 
 
Although the chance of a Passing vessel hitting a platform is extremely low (≈ 0.0001%) (19), 
the consequences are catastrophic.  With the introduction of modern navigational technology, 
the overall trend for collision risk has been reduced; however, the reduction has not been as 
apparent for passing vessels.  Arguments can be made both ways as to whether or not 
technological improvements have actually reduced the risk of collision by a passing vessel.   
 
It could be reasoned that a majority of the collisions are caused by irresponsible navigators.  
But, in scenarios where the navigator is distracted and unaware that the vessel is on a collision 
course, AIS has made it possible for the vessel to be identified and contacted by name.  
Although there are no discernable trends (36), it is assumed that technological advances can 
reduce the likelihood of passing vessel-platform collisions if VTS, the platform, and/or ERRV 
are monitoring the area and the navigator is present to receive the warnings.   
 
What are the causal factors of vessel-platform collision and the barriers are in place to 
prevent such an event? 
 
An accident is often the result of multiple factors.  If the only factors to be identified are those 
which immediately precede the collision, it could result in development of barriers which treat 
the symptoms and have little impact on reducing collision risk.  While the causal factors 
addressed in the existing models are still relevant today, technological advances reduce the 
likelihood of their occurrence.  Concurrently, new factors, such as reduced navigator 
prudence, have emerged.  Similarly, barriers have been enhanced by technology.  Because an 
errant vessel can be detected at a range of 40 nautical miles with AIS, compared to the 12 
nautical mile range achieved be radar, a vessel on a collision course can be detected and 
contacted earlier.  If judged necessary, emergency response plans can be initiated more 
rapidly.     
 
As technology improves, some factors may become less relevant and others could surface.   
 
Should newer modeling theories be used to capture the socio-technical relationships? 
 
Different modeling theories present different views of the process and the conditions 
necessary for a collision to occur.  Many of the current collision models are based on fault 
trees and event trees.  These sequential accident models may not account adequately for the 
complexity of modern socio-technical systems.  In systemic models, the idea of causality is 
replaced with emergence.  Models based on Monte Carlo simulation are limited, in that the 
ranking of frequency and severity is largely influenced by human judgment.   
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In order to identify potential trends, vessels and platforms should report all collisions, safety 
zone infringements and near miss incidents.  Unfortunately, most accident databases fail to 
include near-miss reporting primarily because there is little motivation for personnel to report 
them.  It is important that the causes leading up to a near-miss incident be identified in order 
to capture them properly in the model (13).  If a new model is developed, more efforts should 
be made to improve surveillance and accident/incident reporting.  Passing vessel-platform 
collisions are infrequent, but it is incorrect to assume that only a low standard navigator will 
be involved.  In collisions involving field related traffic, the OIM has a say in the quality of 
the navigator, and yet the accidents still occur. 
 
Both the petroleum and the international maritime industries are affected by passing vessel 
collisions and accordingly, both are committed to reducing the risk further.  Generally, 
averting a collision by reducing the initiating causes will be less costly than the consequences. 
 
Modern simulation packages can give a more complete and realistic picture of collision risk. 
This presents an opportunity for both parties to better understand the root causes and to decide 
the best way to allocate resources to reduce collision risk.  Additionally, cross-industry dialog 
may reiterate the importance of avoiding conflicts between sailing routes and petroleum 
activities.   
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7 Conclusions 
During the last two decades, the situational awareness for large vessels has greatly improved 
as a result of GPS, AIS, and electronic charts.  Advances will continue to be made and the 
factors leading to a passing vessel colliding with an platform will continue to evolve.  With 
this progression, socio-technical systems have become more complex and the current models 
and methodology shall become outdated.   
 
Updating the existing models or simply applying correction factors to reflect changes in 
technology is not an adequate solution.  The current collision models are based on fault trees 
and event trees, which focus primarily on human errors or equipment failure.  A systemic 
modeling approach would take into account the socio-technical system that shaped the human 
and equipment performance. This offers a better understanding of what could cause a passing 
a vessel collision, and more importantly the opportunity to learn how such collisions could be 
averted.   
 
Developing a passing vessel-platform collision risk model using a Monte Carlo simulation 
tool is achievable and would provide the most realistic representation of the system.  The 
most significant challenge would be obtaining good statistical data for the input variables due 
to the low number of large scale accidents.  However, with proper planning data collection 
could be carried out in conjunction with model development.     
 
In conclusion, the current models are based on the modeling approaches and assumptions 
from the late 1980’s.  At this time, they offered the best available estimate of collision risk 
and are still adequate today. But, just as it would be irresponsible for merchant vessels not to 
incorporate the technological improvements, it would be imprudent not to develop a new 
collision model to reflect advances in theories and simulation.  
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